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DEFAULTS AND CHOICES IN THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT:
How TO INCREASE AUTONOMY, ENCOURAGE
DISCUSSION, AND CIRCUMVENT CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSTRAINTS
Andrew Blair-Stanek*
The law has long recognized the contractual nature of marriage.
The trend, in recent decades, towards respecting autonomy has led to
much greater freedom for couples to modify the terms oftheir marriage.
This Comment explores how states may provide couples a choice of
terms to include in their marriage contract. The potential benefits in-
clude premarital information disclosure, increased individual auton-
omy, and the ability to achieve policy goals that might otherwise con-
flict with constitutional jurisprudence.
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THE MARRIAGE CONTRA CT
DEFAULTS AND CHOICES IN THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT:
How TO INCREASE AUTONOMY, ENCOURAGE
DISCUSSION, AND CIRCUMVENT CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSTRAINTS
INTRODUCTION
Marriage has a long history as contract both in Anglo-American
law and in cultures across the globe.' The vows exchanged in many
American weddings constitute promises with return promises as consid-
eration. In one illustrative case, the bride and groom exchanged vows
and the groom died suddenly seconds thereafter.2 The court held that
normal standards of contract formation apply to marriages and the par-
ties' vows sufficed to create a valid marriage contract. Even though
death cut the ceremony short, the bride had all the legal rights of a wife-
turned-widow.4
Constitutional jurisprudence has long recognized contract and
marriage as areas of state law.5 Legislatures have added many defaults
to contracts, one example of which is the implied but disclaimable war-
ranty of merchantability in the Uniform Commercial Code.6 The law
1 See generally GWEN J. BROUDE, MARRIAGE, FAMILY, AND RELATIONSHIPS: A CROSS-
CULTURAL ENCYCLOPEDIA xi (1994) (discussing many similarities in marriage arrangements
around the world). A number of state statutes explicitly define marriage as a civil contract. See,
e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-101 (2006); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 517.01 (2007).
2 Neiderhiser Estate, 2 Pa. D. & C.3d 302, 305 (Pa. Ct. Com. P1. 1977).
3 Id. at 309.4 Id. at 309- 10.
5 See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 398 (1937) (discussing Nebbia v.
New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537, 538 (1934), which recognized a state's freedom to mandate con-
tract terms); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 207 (1888) (finding special divorce laws are "a le-
gitimate exercise of state power").
6 U.C.C. § 2-314(1) (2003). See also U.C.C. § 2-305(1) (2003) (indicating default price is a
"reasonable price").
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governing matrimony has likewise undergone extensive changes over
time. Divorce law represents a combination of immutable and default
terms inserted by state law into the marriage contract, and premarital
agreements allow marrying parties to depart from these defaults. In-
deed, the move towards greater individual autonomy in the last four
decades has resulted in a much greater willingness on the part of courts
and of legislatures to enforce premarital agreements.7
States have used their powers to set default terms of the marriage
contract in only a very limited way, however, typically dealing solely
with disposition of assets upon divorce. Similarly, states have given
couples very few options for modifying the terms of their marriage con-
tract, instead offering a "one-size-fits-all" marriage. This Comment ar-
gues that legislatures have missed the following three potentially valu-
able uses of default and optional terms: (1) increasing autonomy; (2)
revealing information; and (3) circumventing constitutional constraints.
Presenting couples with different optional terms as checkboxes
on the marriage license application increases the autonomy of individu-
als to structure their marriages as they see fit without the considerable
expense and aggravation of drafting a premarital agreement. 9 These
terms can address issues well beyond asset allocation upon divorce.
Moreover, properly chosen and presented optional terms and defaults
7 See infra Section I.C. See also Barbara Ann Atwood, Ten Years Later: Lingering Concerns
About the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, 19 J. LEGIS. 127, 135-36 (1993).
8 See Carolyn J. Frantz, Should the Rules of Marital Property Be Normative?, 2004 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 265, 267-68 (2004). The related issue of taxation also receives significant attention.
9 Cf Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70
U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1162 (2003) (discussing the paternalistic consequences of government in-
fluence in private choices and posits that this interference may cause individuals to make poor
choices "in terms of their own welfare").
[Vol. 24
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THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT
can encourage a couple contemplating marriage to reveal information to
each other and to discuss issues of import to their relationship.'1 Lastly,
the state can encourage consenting couples to agree to terms that would
conflict with constitutional jurisprudence if implemented as mandatory
terms.
This Comment proceeds in three parts. Part I reviews the history
and theories of marriage as contract and the modem trend towards
greater contractual autonomy. Part II presents the details of this Com-
ment's proposal. These include the various ways legislatures can pre-
sent terms on the marriage license application, as well as several exam-
ple terms that exhibit the power and flexibility of this approach. Part III
uses one of these example terms to demonstrate the feasibility of using
this approach to circumvent constitutional constraints.
I. MARRIAGE AS CONTRACT WITH DEFAULTS
The past four decades have witnessed a profound shift in the le-
gal and theoretical understanding of marriage. The availability of mar-
riage has expanded to include interracial couples, 1 same-sex partners,' 2
and those who do not even marry. 13 The end of marriage has similarly
changed, with the advent of no-fault divorces and the enforceability of
10 See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic The-
ory of Default Rules, 99 YALE. L.J. 87, 97 (1989) (arguing penalty defaults promote production
of information). Marrying couples generally communicate well, but skillfully-crafted optional
terms and defaults can facilitate communication and force parties to reveal many hidden agendas
going into marriage.
11 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
12 Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941,948 (Mass. 2003). See also Baker v.
State, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999).
13 Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106,110, 113 (Cal. 1976) (involving cohabitation contracts of
non-married persons and the rise in unmarried individuals sharing a home).
2008]
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premarital agreements. 14 In short, the contractual autonomy of marrying
couples has vastly expanded.
A. The History of Marriage as Contract
In many societies, negotiated marriages are the norm.15 In these
societies the contractual aspect of marriage seems most obvious. Ac-
cording to one survey, matrimony in nearly half of all societies involves
a direct transfer of property between the families.16 Ironically, the tradi-
tional Anglo-American notion of marrying for love, which leads some
to recoil from viewing marriage as a contract, has historical roots in pre-
Christian Germanic customs of free contract.' 7
Marriage also denotes status, indicating membership in a unique
social and religious institution. The conceptions of marriage as contract
and as status are not mutually exclusive, and both views find support in
the law' 8 and in everyday speech. When we say "Xand Yare married"
we convey both their contractual relationship and their status, just as
saying "A and B are partners in a firm" implies both the existence of a
partnership agreement and status within an institution.
The last four decades have witnessed a general shift in the em-
14 See infra Section I.C.
15 PATRICIA UBEROI, FAMILY, KINSHIP AND MARRIAGE IN INDIA 2 (1993).
16 See BROUDE, supra note 1, at 40. In a sample of 565 societies, forty-seven percent charac-
terized marriage by a monetary transaction. Id.
"7 ALAN MACFARLANE, MARRIAGE AND LOVE IN ENGLAND: MODES OF REPRODUCTION 1300-
1840 125-26 (1986). Indeed, another historian has commented that with respect to marriage and
property, the English were "for the Middle Ages, an unusually individualistic people." Charles
Donahue, Jr., English and French Marriage Cases in the Later Middle Ages: Might the Differ-
ences Be Explained by Differences in the Property Systems?, in MARRIAGE, PROPERTY, AND
SUCCESSION 339, 362 (Lloyd Bonfield ed., 1992).
18 See Maynard, 125 U.S. at 213. "'[Marriage] is more than a contract.... It partakes more
of the character of an institution regulated and controlled by public authority, upon principles of
public policy, for the benefit of the community.'" Id. (quoting Wade v. Kalbfleisch, 58 N.Y.
282, 284 (1874)).
[Vol. 24
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THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT
phasis of the law of marriage away from status and towards contract. 9
For example, in 1972 the Supreme Court declared a married "couple is
not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an asso-
ciation of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emo-
tional makeup. '20 The Supreme Court of California, in Marvin v.
Marvin,21 recognized cohabitation contracts, which offer a contractual
alternative to marriage.22 Similarly, recent state court decisions mandat-
ing same-sex marriage 23 and civil unions24 have moved state law to-
wards ever-greater freedom for individuals to order their marital af-
fairs.25 This shift towards marital autonomy and marriage as contract
has coincided with three interrelated trends: the secularization of the
law;26 the increased emphasis on individual sexual, reproductive and
marital autonomy; 27 and the rise in popularity of the law and economics
19 See generally Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443,
1446-47 (1992) (documenting this shift from status to contract and exploring the shift's antece-
dents and consequences).
20 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (striking down a Massachusetts law which
criminalized the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried individuals).
21 557 P.2d 106.
22 Id. at 110.
23 Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 948 (holding state marriage law discrimination against same-sex
couples impermissible).
24 Baker, 744 A.2d at 867 (mandating that same-sex couples must have the option of either
marriage or civil unions).
25 Ironically, the strongly anti-gay-marriage reaction of Virginia also shows the contractual
nature of marriage. "A civil union, partnership contract or other arrangement between persons
of the same sex purporting to bestow the privileges or obligations of marriage is prohibited."
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.3 (2007) (emphasis added). This statute's interference with contractual
autonomy-and its attendant harsh results-has attracted criticism. See, e.g., Laura L. Hutchi-
son, Couple Feels Forced to Leave, FREE LANCE-STAR, Jan. 9, 2005, at 1, available at
http://www.fredericksburg.com/News/FLS/2005/012005/01092005/1627908.
26 See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,606-07 (1971) (striking down laws providing
public funding for religious schools as fostering excessive entanglement between the state and
religion).
27 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973); Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 438; Goodridge,
798 N.E.2d at 941.
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movement.28
B. A Law and Economics View
Taking a law and economics perspective, one can view married
parties as rational agents who aim to maximize the benefits of commit-
ment, intimacy, companionship, and child-rearing. 29 As with any con-
tract, the parties enter marriage when the present expected value, or
"marital surplus," created by the relationship exceeds that of the alterna-
tive-being single. Similarly, a party will "breach" by divorcing when
an alternative, such as being single or marrying another, offers a greater
present expected value than remaining in the marriage. This insight,
grounded in law and economics, provided great thrust to the no-fault di-
vorce movement.3 °
Marriage bears little resemblance to contracts to buy a given
number of widgets at a certain price per widget, but rather appears
closer to "relational contracts," which broadly define obligations and
expectations, and which primarily rely upon continued value creation
and norms for enforcement.31 For example, relational contracts govern
law firm partnerships and long-term dealings between manufacturers
and essential part suppliers. Upon breach, the relational contract typi-
cally provides guidance in awarding damages. Just as the body of law
surrounding the Uniform Partnership Act provides default terms for
28 See Singer, supra note 19, at 1508, (crediting, in part, the law and economics view of peo-
ple as rational maximizers for this shift in the law's view of marriage).
29 Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. REv.
1225, 1254 (1998).
30 See Singer, supra note 19, at 1512.
31 Scott & Scott, supra note 29, at 1229. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 145-54 (6th ed. 2003) (summarizing the law and economics views of mar-
riage).
[Vol. 24
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courts at the dissolution of a partnership,32 family law guides divorces.
Judges and legislatures typically aim to craft defaults that come closest
to giving parties what they would have wanted, thereby reducing overall
transaction costs by minimizing the amount of effort expended on con-
tracting around the defaults.33
However, much of the criticism leveled against majoritarian de-
faults in general 34 also applies specifically to the current majoritarian
defaults governing divorce. First, critics note that vague majoritarian
defaults give parties incentive to shift issue resolution from the ex ante
premarital situation to publicly subsidized courts for ex post resolu-
tion.35 Divorce cases consume a substantial share of state court re-
sources,3 6 suggesting that marrying parties indeed leave many crucial is-
sues unresolved ex ante.
Second, maj oritarian defaults allow parties to withhold informa-
32 See UNIF. P'SHiPACT § 31 (1997).
33 The broad outlines of current no-fault divorce law come quite close to what a majority of
individuals would include in their marriage contract, starting with certain basic assumptions
about human behavior and without any preconception of marriage. Scott & Scott, supra note
29, at 1300.
34 See generally Ayres & Gertner, supra note 10, at 93 (critiquing majoritarian defaults). This
Comment does not deal with externalities to the marriage contract, such as to children. Note
that there is one general critique ofmajoritarian defaults-that they ignore the possibility of cer-
tain subsets of the population who will already be more likely to contract around defaults. For
example, individuals entering a second marriage are far more likely to sign a premarital contract
than those entering a first marriage, presumably to protect the interests of children from the first
marriage. See LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT: SPOUSES, LOVERS, AND THE
LAW 153-54 (1981).
35 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 10, at 93.
36 JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, THE LITIGIOUS SOCIETY x (paperback ed. 1983) (estimating divorce
actions account for "more than half' of cases filed in state courts). See, e.g., JUDICIAL COUNCIL
OF CALIFORNIA, COURT STATISTICS REPORT: STATEWIDE CASELOAD TRENDS 1989-1990
THROUGH 1998-1999, at *55 (2000), available at
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/documents/2000csr.pdf (approximately one-tenth of civil
cases); ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COURTS OF KANSAS (2005), available at
http://judicial.kscourts.org:7780/stats/05/contents.htm (14,735 divorces compared to 7,277 con-
tract actions).
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tion that increases their own welfare by less than it detracts from the
well-being of the other party.37 Parties may do this either strategically
or unintentionally. As an example, one party may have an undisclosed
disposition to physical violence, which no-fault divorce defaults give no
incentive to reveal. Disclosure of this disposition might allow the other
party to insist upon therapy as a precondition of marriage-or not get
married at all. Fixing this failure of majoritarian defaults is one of the
three benefits of using the approach outlined in this Comment: provid-
ing well-crafted defaults and optional terms leads parties to reveal in-
formation and discuss issues of import to the marriage.
C. Departing from the Defaults: Premarital
Agreements
Entering a marriage without a premarital agreement may be
characterized as signing a form contract with hundreds of pages of fine
print not even included on the contract itself and with terms that may
change without notice. Written premarital agreements first appeared in
English legal history more than four centuries ago.38 Fathers' concern
for their daughters' well-being provided the impetus for many of these
contracts, which explicitly provided for the bride's maintenance if wid-
owed.3 9 However, until the landmark 1970 ruling in Posner v. Posner,4 °
37 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 10, at 94.
38 Courts of both law and equity were passing on the validity of premarital agreements in the
sixteenth century. See 5 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 310, 311 (3d ed.
1945).
39 See Lloyd Bonfield, Property Settlements on Marriage in Englandfrom the Anglo-Saxons
to the Mid-Eighteenth Century, in MARRIAGE, PROPERTY, AND SUCCESSION 287, 305 (Lloyd
Bonfield ed., 1992).
40 233 So. 2d 381, 385 (Fla. 1970) (holding premarital contracts do not contravene public pol-
icy).
[Vol. 24
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American courts uniformly refused to enforce premarital contracts re-
garding property disposition upon divorce.4'
Since then, the American Law Institute has proposed the Uni-
form Premarital Agreement Act ("UPAA"), 42 which twenty-seven of the
states have enacted since 1983.43 This statute gives presumptive validity
to all premarital agreements so long as they fully disclose each party's
assets and do not contravene public policy.44 Moreover, the courts of
those states whose legislatures have not passed the UPAA now over-
whelmingly enforce premarital agreements much like any other con-
tracts.4 5
This legal shift has spawned a wide array of agreements cover-
ing many aspects of married life, ranging from random spousal drug
testing46 to football watching47 to the preferred brand of gas.48 Some
scholars welcome this trend, arguing that premarital contracts generally
41 See Charles W. Gamble, TheAntenuptial Contract, 26 U. MIAMIL. REV. 692,704 (1972).
42 UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 1-11, 9C U.L.A. 39 (1983).
43 See UNIF. LAW COMM'RS, A FEW FACTS ABOUT THE UNIFORM PREMARITAL AGREEMENT
ACT, http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformact-factsheets/uniformacts-fs-upaa.asp (last visited
Jan. 8, 2008) (listing the states that have adopted the act, as well as those considering it).
44 UPAA § 6(a)-(b), 9C U.L.A. 48-49 (2001). Agreements dealing with disposition of chil-
dren are included as agreements contravening public policy. UPAA § 3(b). Also, some states
retain their hostile stance towards premarital agreements executed prior to passage of the UPAA.
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-36 (West 2007).
45 See Brooks v. Brooks, 733 P.2d 1044, 1049-51 (Alaska 1987) (listing reasons modem
courts prefer to enforce premarital agreements). See also Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162,
168 (Pa. 1990).
46 Sandy Cohen, Untying the Knot, Celeb-Style, VENTURA COUNTY STAR, Dec. 20, 2005, Life,
Arts and Living, at 1 (listing actual premarital agreement terms including financial penalties for
failing random drug tests, impoliteness to in-laws, or more than one football game per Sunday).
47 Id.
48 One commentator recounts the terms of a sixteen-page premarital agreement regulating
pocket money, gas brand, and frequency of healthy intercourse. Gary Belsky, Living by the
Rules, CNN MONEY, May 1, 1996, http://money.cnn.com/magazines/moneymag/moneymag_
archive/1 996/05/01/212090/index.htm.
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air secrets, clarify expectations, and reduce the trauma of divorce.49
Others point out that premarital contracts empower women, who often
have superior bargaining power at the inception of the marriage than at
its dissolution when they have given up a career for childrearing. One
commentator even proposed making premarital contracts mandatory in
order to ease the divorce process and recognize the diversity of mar-
riages.5 Meanwhile, others point out that the UPAA and various state
court rulings narrow conscionability review of premarital agreements
beyond what even normal contracts receive.52 Calls for reform include
requiring that each party employ independent counsel as a prerequisite
for enforceability. 3
The extraordinary complexity of default divorce rules means that
only with premarital contracts will marrying couples get the contract
they actually desire.54 Empirically, marrying couples exhibit unwar-
ranted optimism about their chances of remaining married 55 and perform
only slightly better than chance in correctly identifying the statutory de-
faults.56 Only one state aims to inform marrying parties of the outlines
49 See Allison A. Marston, Note, Planning for Love: The Politics ofPrenuptial Agreements,
49 STAN. L. REV. 887, 895, 896 (1997).
50 Kaylah Campos Zelig, Putting Responsibility Back into Marriage: Making a Case for
Mandatory Prenuptials, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1223, 1229 (1993); Lloyd Cohen, Marriage, Di-
vorce and Quasi Rents; Or, "I Gave Him the Best Years of My Life ", 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 267
(1987).
51 Zelig, supra note 50, at 1229, 1230.
52 See Atwood, supra note 7, at 146.
53 See Marston, supra note 49, at 913-14.
54 See Zelig, supra note 50, at 1229.
55 See Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship Is AboveAverage: Per-
ceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 439,
443 (1993).
56 Id. at 441. Recently-married respondents correctly identified the property-disposition term
statutorily included in the marriage contract only slightly more than fifty-two percent of the
time. Id.
[Vol. 24
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of the defaults by requiring distribution of an informative pamphlet to
those applying for marriage licenses.
Some states have taken this idea of marriage as contract to the
next logical step, offering easily accessible alternative bundles of terms.
In 1998, Alaska began giving couples the option of community-
property marriage. 8 Since 1997, Louisiana has offered both standard
no-fault marriages and "covenant marriages," which retain immediate
divorce in cases of fault such as physical abuse, but establish a lengthy
waiting period for divorce without fault.59 While these are blunt op-
tions, including an incredible number of terms in the contract all at
once, they are natural in the path of evolution towards the proposal in
this Comment.
II. BASIC PROPOSAL AND APPLICATIONS
This Part sets forth the details of the proposal and considers the
three routes that legislatures have for offering a term as well as how to
ensure that courts will enforce a couple's decision as conscionable and
valid. Several example terms demonstrate the approach's versatility.
With these examples as a reference point, this Part concludes by show-
57 LA. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LOUISIANA'S COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW AND HoW TO CHANGE ITS
EFFECTS BY CONTRACT 2 (2004), available at
http://www.ag.state.la.us/pdfs/community-property.pdf. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:237
(2007). See also Lynn A. Baker, Promulgating the Marriage Contract, 23 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 217,258 (1990) (commenting on the failure of other states to follow Louisiana's deci-
sion to disseminate terms of the marriage contract).
58 ALASKA STAT. § 34.77.030 (2007).
59 LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:293 (2007). See Melissa Lawton, Note, The Constitutionality of
Covenant Marriage Laws, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 2471, 2515-16 (1998) (concluding covenant
marriage laws would likely pass constitutional muster even if they are questionable public pol-
icy and have not received wide acceptance). See also James Herbie DiFonzo, Customized Mar-
riage, 75 IND. L.J. 875, 955 (2000) (comparing covenant marriage to state-sponsored premarital
contracts).
2008]
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ing that keeping choices private and allowing for changed circumstances
furthers all three goals: increased autonomy; information disclosure;
and circumventing constitutional constraints.
A. Routes
This Comment will consider three routes for a term to be volun-
tarily included, or not included, in a couple's marriage contract: (1)
Opt-In. The state allows marrying couples to opt-into contractual terms,
including a term by checking a box on the marriage license application;
(2) Default with Opt-Out. The state makes a term the default, and it is
included unless the couple opts-out by checking a box on the marriage
license application; (3) Affirmative Choice. The state puts both an opt-
in and an opt-out checkboxes on the marriage license application and
does not issue the marriage license unless the couple selected one.6 °
The three routes differ in a number of respects including the
amount of information they encourage parties to reveal and the constitu-
tional objections they might raise. One should note, however, that af-
firmative choice is simply a hybrid of the other two-it involves both
opt-in and opt-out checkboxes. The name comes from the requirement
that the marrying parties must make an "affirmative choice" whether
they want the term in their marriage contract or not.
B. Conscionability and Validity
As with any contract term, one party to the marriage could al-
60 Cf Ayres & Gertner, supra note 10, at 97. Affirmative choices are a special type of pen-
alty default, providing a default of complete legal non-recognition if a term is not explicitly in-
cluded. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-201 cmt. 1 (1995) (requiring parties to affirmatively supply a
quantity for a contract to be enforceable).
[Vol. 24
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ways challenge a term included in any of the three methods above by
arguing it is unconscionable. Courts since West CoastHotel Co. v. Par-
rish6 1 have recognized contract as an area of state law,62 and have ac-
knowledged marriage as state law since long before that. 63 As a result,
the same legislation modifying the marriage license application could
also instruct courts to presume such terms to be conscionable and valid,
thereby rendering the point moot. Such legislation may be unnecessary,
as judges may deem a term's inclusion fully compatible with public pol-
icy by dint of the legislature offering it. Additionally, such provisions
do not constitute a "contract of adhesion" regardless of how presented
because the parties can enter into the marriage contract without them.
When dealing with terms that waive constitutional rights, how-
ever, courts have found due process concerns if the term was not clearly
a waiver. 64 Legislation could potentially address this concern in a num-
ber of ways. For example, simple, direct wording next to the relevant
checkbox on the marriage license application would ameliorate these
concerns, as would bolding the word "WAIVER" on the form. Addi-
tionally, the legislature could direct the distribution of a plain-language
brochure explaining the terms to all marriage license applicants.
C. Example Terms
The routes listed above could work for any conceivable premari-
tal contract term. This Comment now examines several possible terms
61 300 U.S. 379.
62 West Coast Hotel Co., 300 U.S. at 398.
63 E.g.,Maynard, 125 U.S. at 210.
64 See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 95 (1972) ("For a waiver of constitutional rights
in any context must, at the very least, be clear.").
65 Cf supra note 57.
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that exemplify the power and flexibility of this approach. Several of
these terms might also prove controversial. However, this Comment
proposes a broad policy lever and not these particular example terms.
1. Gun Surrender
Despite the frighteningly high prevalence of gun-related domes-
tic violence, 66 judges hearing temporary restraining order ("TRO") ap-
plications grant firearms-confiscation to an astonishingly low twelve
percent of those applicants who request it.67 Now consider the follow-
ing clause:
Husband agrees that upon the request of wife, he or his
agent will surrender all firearms in his possession to law
enforcement for a period of at least fourteen days. The
parties explicitly intend specific performance, and the
husband knowingly WAIVES rights to pre-deprivation
hearings and intends that the wife may obtain an ex parte
judicial injunction enforcing this promise.
Such a clause would allow the wife to walk into a courthouse
and get an injunction forcing her husband to surrender his firearms. She
could do this in conjunction with a TRO or at any time when she has
any reason to fear her husband might threaten or injure her with a gun.
Unlike with a TRO, an injunction would require neither filing an affida-
66 Firearms account for approximately sixty-five percent of domestic violence homicides. See
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS FACTBOOK, VIOLENCE BY INTIMATES:
ANALYSIS OF DATA ON CRIMES BY CURRENT OR FORMER SPOUSES, BOYFRIENDS, AND
GIRLFRIENDS 10 (1998), http://www.ojp.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/vi.pdf. Moreover, having one or more
guns in the home made a woman 7.2 times more likely to be the victim of a domestic violence
homicide. See James E. Bailey et al., Risk Factors for Violent Death of Women in the Home,
157 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 777, 780 (1997).
67 EVE S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
RESPONSE 238 (3d ed. 2003).
[Vol. 24
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vit nor "detailed allegations" about "risk of immediate and irreparable
harm., 68 A wife could even use it if she suspected her husband might
attempt suicide.69
Judges have long issued negative injunctions to enforce con-
70tracts, particularly if the parties have expressly contracted for specific
performance or if monetary damages are inadequate to protect the pro-
misee.7' Although it requires the actual surrender of firearms by the en-
joined party, this injunction is essentially negative in nature: cease fire-
arm possession. Moreover, monetary damages clearly fail to protect
against death or serious injury from guns wielded by irate spouses. A
fourteen day injunction is reasonable in duration.
Offering marrying couples the opportunity to include such a
term would yield all three possible benefits: increased autonomy, infor-
mation disclosure, and circumventing constitutional constraints. First, it
would allow couples the autonomy to choose a nontraditional relation-
ship with firearms. Second, the very presence of the option would en-
courage discussion of attitudes towards firearms and domestic violence.
As described above in Section I.B., sometimes the information thus re-
vealed could lead to society being better off. Third, a legislature bold
enough to make such a provision mandatory in marriage contracts (as
68 See Blazel v. Bradley, 698 F. Supp. 756, 763-64 (W.D. Wis. 1988) (listing due process re-
quirements for TROs, including affidavits "containing detailed allegations" and "risk of imme-
diate and irreparable harm").
69 See Arthur L. Kellermann et al., Suicide in the Home in Relation to Gun Ownership, 327
NEW ENG. J. MED. 467,470 (1992) (noting suicide is nearly five times more likely to occur in a
household with a firearm than in one without).
70 See Lumley v. Wagner, 42 Eng. Rep. 687, 687 (Ch. 1852). See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 357(2)(a) (1981).
71 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-716 (2003). Contra RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 359(1)
(1981). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF CONTRACTS § 360 (1981).
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opposed to merely an option on the marriage license application) would
run into a bevy of federal and state constitutional objections. Any ex
parte injunction faces due process concerns, and this clause would not
withstand federal constitutional jurisprudence if mandatory.7 1 Further,
its gender-specific nature would run afoul of equal protection law.73 Fi-
nally, since it deals with firearms it might conflict with either the Fed-
eral Second Amendment,7 4 or-more likely-the provisions in the vast
majority of state constitutions that go beyond their federal counterpart.75
72 See Blazel, 698 F. Supp. at 763-64. Federal courts facing similar situations have discerned
four required procedural safeguards for issuance of ex parte injunctions or restraining orders:
(1) "participation by a judicial officer;" (2) "a prompt post-deprivation hearing;" (3) "verified
petitions or affidavits containing detailed allegations based on personal knowledge;" and (4)
"risk of immediate and irreparable harm." Id. The term in question would fail to meet condi-
tions (3) and (4). Permitting such a clause would also remove much of the discretion exercised
by judges, mandated by safeguard (1), who often show a shocking insensitivity to the plight of
battered women. See, e.g., JAMES PTACEK, BATTERED WOMEN IN THE COURTROOM (1999) (not-
ing that many have termed this "judicial harassment of battered women"). One woman who
went before a judge to get a temporary restraining order stated that she "[flelt like [she] did
something wrong, embarrassing [sic] in front of all these people." Id. at 154. A female judge
from Massachusetts minimized a victim's ordeal as a mere lover's quarrel by stating, "Any
chance of getting back together?... You took this out on Valentine's Day." Id. at 103. An-
other judge told a woman seeking a TRO, "[M]ost people get married and do not have illegiti-
mate children. These things don't happen to them." Id. at 52. Yet another judge "ordered a
woman seeking a restraining order out of the courtroom for wearing shorts." Id. at 93.
73 See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 730 (1982) (holding that poli-
cies intended to benefit women may fail intermediate scrutiny); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
197 (1976) (establishing intermediate standard of review for gender classifications); Eckert v.
Town of Silverthome, 25 F. App'x 679, 685 n.2 (10th Cir. 2001) (noting that the appellants did
not challenge the statute on the ground that it requires only the arrest of men in a domestic vio-
lence situation because such a statute would not survive a challenge based on equal protection).
But see Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001) ("The difference between men and women in
relation to the birth process is a real one, and the principle of equal protection does not forbid
Congress to address the problem at hand in a manner specific to each gender."); Michael M. v.
Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464,475-76 (1981) (upholding a gender-specific
statutory ripe law as constitutional); State v. Wright, 563 S.E.2d 311, 313 (S.C. 2002) (uphold-
ing gender-specific domestic violence legislation as constitutional).
74 U.S. CONST. amend. II.
75 See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 26; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 19; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 26; ARK.
CONST. art. II, § 5; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 13; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 15; DEL. CONST. art. I, §
20; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 8; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, VIII; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 17; IDAHO
CONST. art. I, § 11; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 22; IND. CONST. art. I, § 32; KAN. CONST. BILL OF
RIGHTS, § 4; Ky. CONST. BILL OF RIGHTS, § 1; LA. CONST. art. I, § 11; ME. CONST. art. I, § 16;
MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. 17; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 6; MISS. CONST. art. III, § 12; MO. CONST. art.
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2. Abortion Notification
Consider the following hypothetical contract term:
Each spouse 76 agrees to notify the other prior to aborting
any pregnancy, with compensatory damages for breach
payable in the event of divorce. The damages are
waived in case of: any medical risk to the spouse; in-
ability to find the other spouse; separation; any sexual or
physical assault, reported or unreported; pregnancy re-
sulting from adultery; or, reasonable grounds to believe
notice will cause the other spouse to react violently to-
wards any individual whatsoever.
This term would provide encouragement-not a requirement-
for a wife to notify her spouse prior to aborting a pregnancy that grew
out of their marriage. This compares favorably to the Pennsylvania
statutory provision77 requiring abortion notification that the Supreme
Court ruled unconstitutional in the landmark decision Planned Parent-
hood v. Casey.78
One reason the Casey plurality found the statute to constitute an
undue burden was the weakness of its domestic violence exceptions,79
which the notification clause above thoroughly addresses. Additionally,
under the Pennsylvania statute, wives who did not meet the narrow ex-
I, § 23; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 12; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 1; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 11, cl. 1; N.H.
CONST. pt. 1, art. 2-a; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 6; N.C. CONST. art. 1, § 30; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 1;
OHIO CONST. art. I, § 4; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 26; OR. CONST. art. I, § 27; PA. CONST. art. 1, §
21; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 22; S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 20; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 24; TENN. CONST. art.
I, § 26; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 23; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 6; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 16; VA. CONST.
art. I, § 13; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 24; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 22; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 25;
WYO. CONST. art. I, § 24.
76 This language aims to be inclusive of both female-male and female-female marriages.
77 See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3209 (West 2007).
7' 505 U.S. 833, 837 (1992).
71 Id. at 887-98; 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3209(b)(4) (West 2007).
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ceptions80 could either notify their spouses or face perjury charges based
on the form provided by the state to verify compliance. 8' The statute re-
lied upon a third party, the physician, to enforce its provisions under
pain of loss of license and punitive damages if the wife did not provide
a signed verification form.82 In contrast, the proposed notification
clause above has broad exceptions and leaves the choice entirely to the
aborting spouse, enforceable by civil damages.
Allowing marrying couples to choose whether to include such a
term in their marriage contract allows states to achieve all three possible
benefits. First, in terms of autonomy, polls strongly suggest that a ma-
jority of Americans would prefer having the option of such a clause. 83
Approximately seventy percent of Americans approve of laws requiring
spousal consent prior to abortion, 84 and many Americans who oppose
mandatory notification laws might opt for such rules governing their
own lives if given the choice.85 Second, presenting couples with this
80 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3209(b)-(c) (providing exceptions only for adultery, inability to
locate the spouse, actually reported sexual assault, fear of abuse to herself, or medical emer-
gency).
81 Id. § 3209(a) states, in pertinent part:
[N]o physician shall perform an abortion on a married woman, except as
provided in subsections (b) and (c), unless he or she has received a signed
statement, which need not be notarized, from the woman upon whom the
abortion is to be performed, that she has notified her spouse that she is
about to undergo an abortion. The statement shall bear a notice that any
false statement made therein is punishable by law.
82 Id. § 3209(e).
83 See Abortion, the Court and the Public, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Oct. 3, 2005),
http://people-press.org/commentary/display.php3?AnalysislD= 119 (citing poll results from re-
cent years that show majorities favor spousal notification).
84 Id. See also Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Gallup/CNN/USA Today Poll
#2003-03, (2003) (finding out of a sample size of 1002, seventy-two percent favored a law "re-
quiring that the husband of a married woman be notified if she decides to have an abortion.").
85 Of course, some might prefer the availability of such an option but not choose it for their
own marriages. However, unlike popular laws that involve externalities, such as support for
public transportation in cities, there is no "free-rider" effect in abortion notification that would
20
Touro Law Review, Vol. 24 [2008], No. 1, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol24/iss1/5
THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT
option would encourage disclosure and discussion about abortion, re-
lated values, and the role expected of the non-child-bearing spouse in
raising children.
Finally, because the term is optional, it would likely allow the
state to circumvent some of the constitutional constraints imposed by
Casey. Part III discusses the constitutionality of this particular term in
detail. Since the Court has recently extended Casey's "undue burden"
standard to many other areas of constitutional jurisprudence,86 this term
provides great insight into the efficacy of the much broader policy pro-
posal in this Comment.
3. Example Terms Seeking Only One or Two
Benefits
The firearms injunction and abortion notification terms already
discussed exhibit all three possible benefits of the approach outlined in
this Comment: increasing autonomy, revealing information, and cir-
cumventing constitutional constraints. However, not all terms offered to
marrying couples need present all three benefits. Legislatures may want
to adopt terms with the aim of achieving only one or two of the afore-
mentioned benefits.
For example, a state could offer a term awarding substantial
monetary damages in divorce to the party wronged by the infidelity that
led to the marriage's end.87 Simply making such a term mandatory
predict public support but private opt-out. But, compare the low participation rate in Louisi-
ana's covenant marriage. See Pam Belluck, States Declare War on DivorceRates, Before Any 'I
Dos ', N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2000, at Al (noting couples in Louisiana choose covenant marriage
at a three percent rate).
86 See infra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
87 Cf Zelig, supra note 50, at 1231. But see Diosdado v. Diosdado, 97 Cal. App. 4th 470,473
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would involve no reasonable constitutional concerns, as several states'
divorce laws still penalize infidelity.88 However, by putting the term as
an option on the marriage license application, states could force parties
to reveal hidden non-monogamous agendas, an example of the benefit
of information revelation.
In Georgia v. Randolph,89 the Supreme Court held one spouse
did not have the power to consent to a warrantless search over the objec-
tions of the other spouse.90 A state could offer a term whereby each
spouse granted the other the perpetual authority to consent to such
searches, thus making Randolph inapplicable to that couple. One would
not expect offering such an option to result in meaningful information
revelation, 91 but it would circumvent the constitutional constraint im-
posed on law enforcement by the Supreme Court's ruling.
Alternatively, states could offer some terms with an eye solely to
enable couples to maximize their autonomy. Such legislation would
bring many of the benefits of premarital agreements to the masses who
do not have the money or inclination to hire an attorney to draft one.
For example, a state could offer the ten terms most frequently seen in
expensive custom-drafted premarital agreements.92
(2002) (finding a similar term unenforceable due to California's strong public policy against
fault in divorce proceedings).
88 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 959
(2002).
89 547 U.S. 103 (2006).
90 Id. at 122-23.
91 Such a term would not only affect the balance between the state and the individual, but also
the balance between a law-abiding spouse and a law-breaking spouse.
92 See Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking about Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L.
REv 9, 86 (1990) (proposing to offer a "menu of standard-form terms"). See also Eric Ras-
musen & Jeffrey Evans Stake, Lifting the Veil of Ignorance: Personalizing the Marriage Con-
tract, 73 IND. L.J. 453, 464 (1998) (arguing that the Rawlsian "veil of ignorance" "can lead to
the misimpression that it is appropriate to try to devise a single set of rules to govern all mar-
[Vol. 24
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4. Combinations and Synergies
Given the usefulness of allowing couples to choose their own
terms, it is easy to imagine states including many choices on their mar-
riage license applications. However, the terms need not remain inde-
pendent from each other. Legislatures can specify interrelations be-
tween terms, such as forcing a couple to choose term B if they also want
term A. Legislatures could have a number of motivations in doing this,
such as term B having a synergy with term A or because B ameliorates a
possible side effect of A. For example, a legislature worried that a par-
ticular term would encourage overly-hasty divorces might only allow
parties to choose that term if they also select a term mandating a month
of mediation prior to divorce.
D. Freedom to Opt-Out Unilaterally Later
Life circumstances do change. Although they generally need
not, legislatures can and should recognize this fact by allowing either
spouse to unilaterally opt-out of a particular term by informing the other
spouse of the opt-out, at any point before the time period relevant to the
term. For example, with the gun disarmament term, opt-out becomes
unavailable to one spouse when the other first perceives the threat of
abuse or violence. The abortion notification term's relevant time period
starts with pregnancy. Similarly, a spouse could no longer unilaterally
withdraw from the term giving substantial damages for infidelity after
an affair had started. Likewise, once a spouse has commenced criminal
behavior, the option to withdraw from the Randolph circumventing term
riages").
20081
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would terminate.
This freedom to opt-out later enhances all three benefits that can
accrue from the use of optional and default terms. First, the freedom to
opt-out obviously enhances individual autonomy. Second, a decision to
opt-out can reveal information. For example, a spouse opting out of
damages for infidelity makes a powerful statement of sexual and emo-
tional dissatisfaction, starting a dialogue and hopefully leading to either
a more satisfying relationship or the end of an unhappy marriage.
Third, as demonstrated in Part III.C. below, when a term aims to cir-
cumvent constitutional constraints, the fact the spouse had later chances
to opt-out unilaterally significantly increases the arguments for enforce-
ability.93
E. Keeping Choices Private
All three benefits accruing from offering a contract term im-
prove when a couple's choices remain private-known only to each
other-unless litigated in divorce. For example, a couple will feel
greater autonomy in making their choices when they can decide whether
and when to reveal their selections to friends, family, and others. A
marrying couple could even check one box and tell friends that they left
it blank, or vice versa. With this autonomy and anonymity also comes
greater leeway to discuss the matters and reveal information to each
other, free of unwanted influence from nonparties to the marriage.
Most importantly, keeping choices private neutralizes possible
objections to using optional and default terms to circumvent constitu-
93 See infra section III.C.
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tional constraints. Precedent recognizes that seemingly benign laws can
stigmatize intended beneficiaries. 94  Unrevealed information cannot
stigmatize. Additionally, privacy would prevent religious denomina-
tions from requiring checking (or not checking) a box as a prerequisite
for a religious marriage ceremony, thereby avoiding any First Amend-
ment free exercise challenge. 9 Finally, not providing public knowledge
of choices prevents infringing a couple's First Amendment right not to
speak.
96
III. EXAMPLES OF CIRCUMVENTING CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSTRAINTS
The approach outlined in this Comment offers three benefits, the
first two of which it has discussed at length: increased autonomy97 and
information revelation.98 The third benefit, circumventing constitutional
constraints, requires additional discussion because it is less intuitive and
because it would receive substantial judicial scrutiny. This Part aims to
demonstrate how the approach can indeed offer that benefit by showing
94 City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 516-17 (1989) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in judgment) ("Although [the legislation at issue] stigmatizes the dis-
advantaged class with the unproven charge of past racial discrimination, it actually imposes a
greater stigma on its supposed beneficiaries.").
95 See Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Empl. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717-18 (1981)
("Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit [e.g., marriage with terms the cou-
ple sees fit] upon conduct proscribed by a religious faith.., thereby putting substantial pressure
on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists.").
96 See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 645 (1943). An analogous situa-
tion exists when a married couple encounters the Presidential Election Campaign checkboxes on
their 1040 Income Tax form asking, "Do you, or your spouse if filing a joint return, want $3 to
go to this fund?" and thereby asking what each spouse thinks of the state of presidential politics.
In both the marriage license in this legislation and the tax form, the spouses reveal their prefer-
ences to each other and an anonymous government bureaucrat. Note also that checking or not
checking the box on the marriage license application does not carry an "overwhelmingly appar-
ent" meaning.
97 See supra Part II.C-E.
98 See supra Part II.C-E.
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that courts would likely uphold its application to the abortion notifica-
tion term from Subsection II.C.2. 99
Since the broad policy lever proposed in this Comment would
work with any premarital contract term, why investigate the abortion
notification term's enforceability? The "undue burden" standard of re-
view exemplified by Casey has deep roots in prior Supreme Court juris-
prudence 00 and has been applied to many contexts outside of abortion.
Since Casey, the Supreme Court has used the "undue burden" standard
to deal with constitutional issues ranging from interstate commerce,101
to affirmative action, 10 2 to the First Amendment. 0 3 Lower courts have
also applied it in many other areas of constitutional law,10 4 and numer-
ous federal statutes and regulations refer to "undue burdens."
' 10 5
99 That term would partially circumvent a constitutional constraint imposed by Casey. Casey,
505 U.S. at 877.
100 See, e.g., Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 506, 520 (1983) (O'Connor, J., concurring);
City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416,464 (1983) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 147 (1976). See generally Michael C. Dorf, Inci-
dental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1175, 1220 (1996) ("[T]he Casey
standard is not anomalous in the Court's privacy doctrine.").
101 See, e.g., Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460,493-94 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (apply-
ing the undue burden standard to the dormant commerce clause).
102 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 341 (2003) ("[A] race-conscious admissions
program must not 'unduly burden individuals who are not members of the favored racial and
ethnic groups.' ").
103 See, e.g., McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 363 (2003) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) ("unduly burdens the First Amendment freedoms of purchasers"); Illinois ex rel.
Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., 538 U.S. 600,616 (2003) (" 'unduly burdensome' prophy-
lactic rule").
104 See, e.g., Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1462, 1464 (W.D.
Wash. 1994) (applying the undue burden standard to assisted suicide), rev'd, 49 F.3d 586 (9th
Cir. 1995), affd en banc, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd sub nom., Washington v. Glucks-
berg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
105 E.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii) (West 2005); 6 C.F.R. § 5.48 (2007). The Su-
preme Court has even used the term in interpreting legislative intent of an early twentieth-
century law. Amoco Prod. Co. v. S. Ute Indian Tribe, 526 U.S. 865, 875 (1999) ("Rejecting
broader proposals, Congress chose a narrow reservation of the resource that would address the
exigencies of the crisis at hand without unduly burdening the rights of homesteaders or imped-
ing the settlement of the West.") (emphasis added).
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Casey introduced the "undue burden" standard into the forefront
of constitutional jurisprudence, 0 6 and its effect has gone well beyond
abortion.10 7 Yet, for all that, the Casey Court found that all but one of
the challenged provisions of the Pennsylvania law passed the "undue
burden" standard; only the law's spousal abortion notification provision
failed.'0 8 Because of this, and because of the well-developed body of
abortion jurisprudence, a term dealing with abortion notification pro-
vides the ideal vehicle for showing the power of this Comment's ap-
proach to circumvent constitutional constraints. This Comment pro-
poses a policy lever with much broader applications than this particular,
narrow term.
As a starting point, everyday American life involves signing
away core constitutional rights. Most form contracts contain arbitration
clauses waiving Seventh Amendment rights to civil jury trial--clauses
that courts typically enforce.' 0 9 Many routine transactions in high-
technology and finance involve signing nondisclosure agreements for-
feiting First Amendment rights. Some public housing authorities ask
residents to sign waivers of their Fourth Amendment protections against
warrantless searches to cut down on crime. 0 As part of plea bargains
106 See Lawton, supra note 59, at 2490-91.
107 The Court has continued to apply the "undue burden" standard in subsequent abortion
cases. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).
108 Casey, 505 U.S. at 898 ("Women do not lose their constitutionally protected liberty when
they marry.").
")9 See Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh
Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 669, 695-96 (2001). See gen-
erally Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Clauses, Jury-Waiver Clauses, and Other Contractual
Waivers of Constitutional Rights, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167 (2004) (discussing scenarios
where individuals waive constitutional rights).
110 Michael Briggs, Public HousingAgencies Shun Gun Sweeps, CHICAGO SuN-TMEs, May 9,
1995, at 61.
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and other deals with prosecutors, criminal defendants often bargain
away their constitutional safeguards. The Supreme Court has held that a
"criminal defendant may knowingly and voluntarily waive many of the
most fundamental protections afforded by the Constitution.""' Other
decisions have found that many Fourteenth Amendment civil procedural
due process rights are also subject to waiver.' 12 This background should
make clear that the idea of waiving constitutional rights on the marriage
license application does not stand far from the mainstream of American
legal practice.
A. In a Private Premarital Agreement
Suppose that two spouses included the abortion notification term
from Subsection II.C.2 in aprivately drafted premarital agreement. A
constitutional challenge to the enforceability of such a clause1 13 by a di-
vorce court would most likely be grounded in the state entanglement
doctrine exemplified by Shelley v. Kraemer.'14 That case held court en-
forcement of a private, racially-discriminatory real estate covenant
impermissibly entangled the state in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 15 Similarly, one could argue a
divorce court's acceptance of the proposed abortion notification clause
would impermissibly entangle the state in limiting the constitutional
right to choose abortion.
Predicting the constitutionality of enforcing a premarital agree-
"' United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 201 (1995).
112 See, e.g., D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185 (1972) ("The due process
rights to notice and [a] hearing prior to a civil judgment are subject to waiver.").
13 There is no reported case law on abortion-related clauses in premarital agreements.
114 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948).
"' Id. at 20-21. See also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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ment to notify is hampered by the disarray in "state action" jurispru-
dence, which Professor Charles Black famously referred to as "a con-
ceptual disaster area."' 16 However, several striking differences exist be-
tween the exclusionary covenant in Shelley and the proposed clause.
First, Shelley involved racially discriminatory action, violating the core
purpose of the Equal Protection Clause." 7 Enforcing the abortion noti-
fication term, by contrast, imposes a burden merely incidental to the
fundamental right to abortion. Second, enforcing the covenant in Shel-
ley would have restrained a willing buyer and willing seller, 1 8 neither of
whom had ratified the covenant. 19 In comparison, the marrying parties
would have mutually assented to the notification clause and would even
have had the opportunity to opt-out unilaterally. The buyer in Shelley
did not even know of the covenant, let alone play a role in its drafting.12
0
Finally, Shelley involved an injunction blocking a transaction,121 but the
abortion notification clause involves only damages, 122 payable after the
constitutionally protected act occurs.
Another leading state entanglement case, Bell v. Maryland,
23
involved the arrest of sit-in protestors at a segregated restaurant. 24 The
I 6 Charles L. Black, Jr., "State Action, "Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14,
81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 95 (1967) ("The whole thing has the flavor of a torchless search for a way
out of a damp echoing cave.").
117 Shelley, 334 U.S. at 20. See U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
"8 Shelley, 334 U.S. at 19.
119 Id. at 6.
120 Id. at 5.
121 Id. at 6.
122 The Court has found damages enforcing racial covenants unconstitutional. Barrows v.
Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953). In Barrows, the plaintiffs asked for damages of $11,600 for
breach of the covenant. Id. at 255-56. However, the previously-discussed substantial differ-
ences between Shelley and the current case remain.
123 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
124 Bell, 378 U.S. at 227.
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majority voted to remand on non-constitutional grounds.125 In a concur-
ring opinion, Justice Douglas argued the enforcement of trespass laws
by state police and courts in this case amounted to a denial of equal pro-
tection. 126 Realizing that such logic, when taken to an extreme, would
require court monitoring of private dinner party invitations, Douglas
balanced the competing interests.127 He concluded that the rights of the
sit-in protestors in their peaceful fight against the legacy of slavery eas-
ily outweighed the property rights of the restaurant owner. 28
Under this same balancing approach, enforcement of the abor-
tion notification clause 129 would likely be constitutional. 130 Precedent
has long recognized the right of both child-bearing and non-child-
bearing individuals to procreate as fundamental.' 3' Also, state cases
such as Marvin v. Marvin'32 and those granting marriage (or marriage-
like) rights to same-sex couples, 133 as well as a line of federal cases
125 Id. at 241-42.
126 Id. at 260, 261.
127 Id. at 252-55.
128 Bell, 378 U.S at 260.
129 Justice Hugo Black's dissent in Bell v. Maryland argues that this balancing test is unclear
in state action jurisprudence. Id. at 333 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black argued state action
only occurred when enforcing a contract interfering with the actions of two consenting individu-
als, the willing buyer and seller in Shelley. Id. at 330. Justice Black's understanding of the en-
tanglement doctrine would find the notification clause in question constitutional. See Black, su-
pra note 116, at 95.
130 The balancing test does not consider the First Amendment right not to speak, as notifying
one's spouse does not curtail freedom of expression or thought. See West Virginia State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943).
131 See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 382 (1979); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Misso-
ouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); Skinner
v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). But see Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Ca-
sey, 505 U.S. 833, 869 (1992); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130, 131-32 (1989); Lehr
v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 267 (1983); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978).
132 557 P.2d at 122 (recognizing marriage-like contract between an unmarried couple).
133 See, e.g., Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 969-70 (finding that the Massachusetts Constitution
compels recognition of same-sex marriage).
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from Griswold v. Connecticut134 to Lawrence v. Texas 135 have increas-
ingly recognized the right of individuals to order their private relation-
ships without state second-guessing.136 The abortion notification clause
has broad exceptions for situations where the spouse fears any sort of
violent reaction, as well as for medical emergencies involving the
woman's health. Moreover, Roe v. Wade137 and Casey both explicitly
recognized that the state has an interest in potential life.'38 A court
would most likely find that these interests outweigh the burden of dam-
ages for not notifying, which is not itself a fundamental right, but is
merely incidental to the constitutional right to choose.
Interestingly, Justice Stevens, as Circuit Justice, has suggested
that when considering an injunction preventing an abortion, a balancing
of the interests might be appropriate. 39 Stevens implied that a hus-
band's desire not to abort might weigh heavily in favor of permitting an
14 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
'3 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
136 Id. at 567, 578 (holding states may not interfere with consenting adults' sexual relations);
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 (striking down a ban which proscribed distribution of contraception
to married couples).
117 410U.S. 113 (1973).
38 Id. at 162-63 (noting the state's interest in potential life and protecting pregnant women
grows "substantially as the woman approaches term and, at a point during pregnancy, becomes
'compelling' "). The Casey Court overruled prior abortion precedent which found a constitu-
tional violation when the state mandated that health risk information be given to women. Casey,
505 U.S. at 881, 882. The Court reasoned these prior cases were "inconsistent with Roe's ac-
knowledgment of an important interest in potential life." Id. at 882. But see Gonzales v.
Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1619 (upholding the Federal Partial-Birth Abortion Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §
1531); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 937-38 (2000) (ruling that a woman's health always
takes precedence over the state's interest in potential human life).
139 Doe v. Smith, 486 U.S. 1308 (1988). In this case, Justice Stevens, considering an applica-
tion for a writ of injunction, briefly addressed the issue of whether an expectant father can get an
injunction to block an abortion. Id. at 1308. Stevens commented favorably on the Indiana Su-
preme Court's willingness to weigh competing interests in deciding whether to issue an injunc-
tion preventing the abortion. Id. at 1309. He agreed that the parties' not being married and not
planning on ever marrying weighed heavily against injunctive relief. Id. at 1309-10.
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injunction. 140 The clause in question deals only with damages and noti-
fication, not an injunction against the abortion itself, which would im-
pose an exceptionally greater burden on the right to choose.
B. Opt-In
The previous Section argued for the likely constitutionality of a
divorce court's enforcing the proposed notification clause from II.C.2 if
it were included in aprivately-drafted premarital agreement. This Sec-
tion considers whether it would be constitutional if the couple had in-
stead incorporated it into the marriage contract by checking a state-
provided box on the marriage license application to opt-in. It assumes
that the state gives the presumption of validity and conscionability to the
term as discussed in Section II.B, in addition to providing the freedom
to opt-out unilaterally at any point before pregnancy as discussed in
Section II.D. It also presumes the marriage license application promi-
nently displays the text of the clause, and all couples receive a plain-
language brochure explaining its meaning and ramifications.
Opponents of the constitutionality of such a measure might ar-
gue that it represents government coercion into accepting a restriction
on abortion rights. The Supreme Court, however, has rejected similar
coercion arguments before in a very similar context. In both Maher v.
Roe 14' and Harris v. McRae,142 the plaintiffs unsuccessfully attacked
statutes funding childbirth but not abortion. In both cases, the plaintiffs
140 Id. at 1309, 1310.
14' 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (upholding state denial of abortion funding).
142 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding federal denial of abortion funding).
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argued the statutes coerced poor women to choose childbirth. 143 The
Court found the range of options faced by pregnant women was, in fact,
expanded by childbirth funding, which put no obstacle whatsoever in
the way of an abortion. 144  Similarly, the proposed legislation only
enlarges the array of choices and puts no obstacle before a woman wish-
ing to avoid notification or damages: one need simply not check the
opt-in box. Further, one may unilaterally opt-out later.
In Maher and Harris, the Court consistently held that the state
and federal government could make value judgments in the options of-
fered to individuals. 145 It drew a distinction between undue burdens
146
imposed by the force of law and legitimate encouragement of alternative
activity. 47 By putting the opt-in on the marriage license application, the
legislature merely attempts to encourage voluntary agreement to notify
and does not use the force of mandatory law. Moreover, any influence
brought to bear on parties to check an opt-in box pales in comparison to
constitutionally-permissible regulations requiring those contemplating
abortions to know the "philosophic and social" objections against exer-
cise of their constitutional right.
148
Opponents of the proposed legislation might further argue that
141 Harris, 448 U.S. at 316; Maher, 432 U.S. at 469-70.
144 Harris, 448 U.S. at 314 (quoting Maher, 432 U.S. at 474).
145 Id.
146 Id. at 473-74.
147 Harris, 448 U.S. at 314-15 (quoting Maher, 432 U.S. at 474-76).
148 Casey, 505 U.S. at 872.
[T]he State may enact rules and regulations designed to encourage her to
know that there are philosophic and social arguments of great weight that
can be brought to bear in favor of continuing the pregnancy to full term and
that there are procedures and institutions to allow adoption of unwanted
children as well as a certain degree of state assistance if the mother chooses
to raise the child herself.
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the promise to notify or pay damages constitutes an undue burden on
abortion for those women who have opted-in. However, the Court has
repeatedly ruled that state regulations imposing substantial monetary
costs do not impose undue burdens. 149 For example, the Casey Court
upheld a twenty-four-hour waiting period between initial consultation
and abortion, requiring two trips to an abortion clinic.150 No spousal
consent could waive this waiting period. Given the costs of transporta-
tion, lost wages, and extra medical fees, this can impose a substantial
burden in many cases. 151 Similarly, the Court in Maher and Harris
freely accepted that indigence could effectively bar abortion by putting
its price out of reach if a legislature did not provide funding. 152
The twenty-four-hour waiting period and the denial of public
funding for abortion share one notable feature: they impose a burden
prior to the constitutionally protected act of aborting. Not having the
money to buy gas for the second trip to a clinic or lacking funds for the
procedure prevents an abortion as surely as an injunction. By contrast,
the damages in the proposed clause would always come after an abor-
tion, even then only if the couple divorces. Although the Court has
never applied its "prior restraint" framework 153 to the abortion right, it
serves to highlight the difference between the proposed notification
clause and acceptable regulations. Damages in divorce impose a burden
149 See Harris, 448 U.S. at 316; Maher, 432 U.S. at 469.
o Casey, 505 U.S. at 885-87.
151 Cf Janet Benshoof, Planned Parenthood v. Casey: The Impact of the Undue Burden Stan-
dard on Reproductive Health Care, 269 JAMA 2249-50 (1993).
152 See Harris, 448 U.S. at 325; Maher, 432 U.S. at 474-75.
153 See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). The Court, per curiam,
invalidated an injunction based on national security concerns that prevented publication ofclas-
sified documents. Id.
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long after the constitutionally protected act, and only if the couple di-
vorces.
154
C. Default with Opt-Out
This Section considers the constitutionality of including the
abortion notification clause as a default in the marriage contract, with
the option to opt-out by checking a box or by unilaterally opting out any
time prior to pregnancy. The distinction made in Harris and Maher be-
tween undue burdens and legitimate encouragement of alternatives re-
mains applicable to this legislation. Although avoiding the choice be-
tween notification and damages now requires the spouse to check a box,
doing so is far less burdensome than paying for an abortion despite in-
digence. Indeed, one cannot even easily pinpoint what characteristics of
an individual would lead them not to check the box, whereas one can
quite easily identify the characteristic making an abortion unaffordable:
poverty. The proposed legislation retains the availability of unilaterally
opting out at any time prior to pregnancy. The damages remain small
and payable after the abortion, in contrast to the immediate expenses re-
sulting from permissible mandatory rules such the twenty-four-hour pe-
riod in Casey.
155
Supreme Court precedent has long recognized that core constitu-
154 The fact that the opt-in would occur on a marriage license, which is a type of form con-
tract, should have no impact. Notably, although the Supreme Court has jealously guarded
against "prior restraints" on free speech, it has permitted prior restraints when assented to in a
form employment contract. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 510 (1980) (upholding in-
junction requiring that former CIA agent submit all future books to censorship for national secu-
rity purposes in accord with the terms of his employment agreement).
155 Casey, 505 U.S. at 44.
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tional rights can be permanently waived by simple inaction. 156 In Peretz
v. United States, 57 Justice Stevens listed a number of fundamental
criminal rights which precedent clearly holds inaction may permanently
waive: protection against double jeopardy; the right against self-
incrimination; the right against unlawful search and seizure; the right to
be present at all stages of criminal trial; the right to a public trial; and,
the right against unlawful post-arrest delay.158 To this list, Justice Ste-
vens might have added the right to trial in the same venue as the
crime, 159 the right not to be tried in prison clothes, 160 and the right to a
speedy trial.16' The standard for waiving a protection merely incident to
the right to abort, subject only to civil damages and with the availability
of subsequent unilateral opt-out, should not exceed that for permanent
waivers of basic constitutional protections for a criminal defendant's
liberty.
With regard to civil protections, Judge Easterbrook in Hill v.
Gateway 2000, Inc. 162 held that consumers could waive their Seventh
Amendment rights to jury trial by failing to return a computer. 163 The
burden of checking a box is considerably less than the expense and ag-
gravation of returning bulky merchandise. Moreover, the plurality in
156 See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 444 (1944) ("No procedural principle is more
familiar to this Court than that a constitutional right may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil
cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to
determine it.").
... 501 U.S. 923 (1991).
158 Id. at 936-37.
159 United States v. Carreon-Palacio, 267 F.3d 381, 390-91 (5th Cir. 2001).
160 Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512-13 (1976).
161 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 529 (1972).
162 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
163 Id. at 1148, 1151. The court found that, because the buyer did not return the computer
within the thirty-day return policy, the buyer was bound by the arbitration clause included in the
terms sent with the box. Id.
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Casey explicitly recognized that a state could lawfully interpret inaction
as consent to state intervention on behalf of a developing fetus.' 64
Given the fact that avoiding spousal notice is not a fundamental right,
these cases suggest that the legislation in question would likely pass
constitutional scrutiny.
Despite the favorable precedent, encouraging couples to include
a term in the marriage contract via a default may still seem like coercion
or an undue burden to some observers. The claims of coercion separate
into three possible categories: transaction costs, status quo bias, and ir-
rational optimism.
1. Transaction Costs
One can argue that forcing parties who do not want the default
term to opt-out imposes burdens, best understood as non-pecuniary
transaction costs. These include the time and effort required to under-
stand the need to opt-out to achieve the desired term, as well as the pos-
sible impact to marital goodwill from negotiating whether to opt-out. In
the hectic run-up to a wedding, both time and goodwill certainly may be
particularly scarce commodities. This means that marrying parties with
a preference for opting out might bear a substantial burden to educate
themselves of the existence and meaning of the default and to negotiate
between themselves to agree whether to check the opt-out box.
The proposed legislation significantly reduces the burden of
education by ensuring that the marriage license application prominently
displays the clause, along with plain-language explanatory documenta-
164 Casey, 505 U.S. at 870 ("In some broad sense it might be said that a woman who fails to
act before viability has consented to the State's intervention on behalf of the developing child.").
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tion. The legislation further diminishes these burdens by allowing for
unilateral opt-out after marriage, at a point where the costs of opting out
in time, effort and goodwill have declined. These light burdens for opt-
ing out of a default abortion notification term pale in comparison to the
substantial transaction costs required to opt-out of the myriad default
rules currently inserted into the marriage contract. 165 Doing so requires
hiring an attorney to draft a private premarital agreement, with substan-
tial costs in terms of time, expense, and most especially, goodwill.
166
2. Status Quo Bias
The second possible category of perceived coercion from the
proposed default comes from the so-called status quo bias. Empirical
studies have shown that even in situations free of transaction costs,
well-informed contracting parties still show a bias towards adhering to
the status quo provided by the default term.167 This implies that, even
with every possible measure in place to reduce transaction costs, laws
may still influence parties' behavior with the choice of defaults. 168 As a
165 See Baker & Emery, supra note 55.
166 In some cases legal aid lawyers may be available to draft premarital agreements. See, e.g.,
LA. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 57, at 6.
167 See Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L.
REv. 608, 632-33 (1998) (demonstrating empirically that parties tend to prefer default rules in
their contracts). See generally Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Ex-
perimental Tests ofthe Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990)
(providing extensive background material on the status quo bias and numerous other challenges
to assumption of rationality).
168 The closely related idea of endowment effects might give rise to a similar critique. See
Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, supra note 167, at 1345. People tend to view loss of an entitle-
ment as having a greater magnitude than gaining the same entitlement. Id. Applied to the de-
fault context, ifa party that is not childbearing values the entitlement to notification or compen-
satory damages more as a result of the switched default (or a childbearing party values the
entitlement less), the result may be an increased likelihood of accepting the default. This influ-
ence is acceptable under constitutional jurisprudence for the same reasons that the status quo
bias provides an acceptable influence. The option of unilateral opt-out remains ifa childbearing
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result, the proposed legislation would seem to coerce a choice in favor
of notification.
A number of Supreme Court cases, including Maher and Harris,
have held that a state may take a number of steps to influence the deci-
sion whether to exercise the core constitutional right to abort. 169 Casey
allows a state to require physicians to provide information about the al-
ternatives to the abortion right and facts about the fetus such as probable
gestational age, even mandating that the patient take at least twenty-four
hours to contemplate the decision.IV0 "Undue burden" jurisprudence al-
lows states to exercise influence against constitutional rights much more
forcefully and directly than employing the status quo bias.
3. Irrational Optimism
Third, some might argue that the proposed legislation coerces
parties to include the term by playing on irrational optimism marrying
couples show about the likelihood of the marriage's long-term sur-
vival. 171 Two individuals who think they will never part may happily
accept a default potentially imposing compensatory damages upon di-
vorce, thinking the issue immaterial. One might expect, however, for
this irrational optimism to move to realism with time.
In contrast, couples optimistically submit to the myriad of other
marriage contract defaults without a chance to opt-out either on the mar-
party later decides upon a higher value for not agreeing to notify or pay compensatory damages.
169 See, e.g., Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 510 (1989) (quoting Maher,
432 U.S. at 474).
170 Casey, 505 U.S. at 881, 882, 884-85, 887.
171 See Baker & Emery, supra note 55, at 443. In a survey of 135 couples who had recently
applied for marriage licenses, the median expected likelihood of divorce was zero percent. Id.
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riage license application or unilaterally later on.' 72 These other defaults,
of course, can and do result in significant reallocations of money at di-
vorce, without parties even knowing of their existence at the time of
marriage. 173 By allowing unilateral opt-out prior to pregnancy, the pro-
posed legislation provides a quite generous exit compared to contracts
in general, which rarely ever permit unilateral opt-out without dam-
ages. 174 Indeed, if parties never exhibited irrational optimism and cir-
cumstances never changed, there would be no need for either contract
law or divorce law.
D. Affirmative Choice
The same arguments made above regarding the constitutionality
of providing the clause as an opt-in or opt-out apply here. Forcing the
marrying couple to make an affirmative choice is simply a hybrid of
opt-in and default with opt-out.175 However, having the legislature re-
quire an affirmative choice on whether to include the term has four
benefits.
First, mandating affirmative choices allows legislatures to avoid
making any judgments on defaults, leaving the choice completely in the
hands of individuals. Second, it equalizes the transaction costs of opting
in and opting out and eliminates any influence from the status quo
bias.'7 6 As a result, affirmative choice maximizes individual autonomy.
Third, when couples cannot avoid making an affirmative choice, the
172 See id. at 441.
173 See id.
174 Voidable contracts are the largest category of contracts which permit independent with-
drawal. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 7 (1981).
175 See supra sections II.B-C.
176 See Korobkin, supra note 167, at 673-74.
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chances of information disclosure and discussion increase.
Fourth, mandating affirmative choices provides a fallback
should default-with-opt-out be found unconstitutional. Consider two
states, one of which offers term T as an affirmative choice, the other of
which makes T the default with the ability to opt-out. Suppose the Su-
preme Court then held it unconstitutional to make Tthe default with an
opt-out. In that case, the state that used affirmative choice will still have
a basis for continuing to respect the choices of those couples who opted
in to T.
IV. CONCLUSION
The move towards greater individual autonomy and freedom in
family relations has greatly enhanced the law's emphasis on matrimony
as a contract. Commentators and policymakers have long recognized
the value of optional terms and well-crafted defaults in other contractual
regimes such as partnerships and employment. Yet, they have barely
begun to explore the possibilities of using defaults in the marriage con-
tract beyond asset disposition in divorce. This Comment has suggested
three possible ways legislatures could present such terms on the mar-
riage license application: opt-ins, defaults with opt-outs, and affirma-
tive choices. Through judicious use of these three mechanisms with
carefully crafted terms, lawmakers could encourage parties to reveal and
discuss preferences, bolster individual autonomy, and achieve policy
goals that might otherwise narrowly fail constitutional scrutiny. More-
over, by making certain terms prerequisites for others, legislators can
combine terms in sophisticated ways.
Courts throughout history have repeatedly expressed the central-
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ity of matrimony to society, with one opinion calling it a "social institu-
tion of the highest importance."' 77 A majority of Americans enter a
marriage contract during their lives, 178 making it the perfect vehicle for
inserting terms to avoid constitutional jurisprudence, especially given
the key role that marriage plays in daily life and property ownership.
Divorce, sadly, marks the end of approximately half of all marriages,
79
indicating that measures resulting in greater discussion and information
revelation prior to matrimony may contribute significantly to social wel-
fare. This Comment aims to lead more commentators and legislators to
recognize the possibility of using this policy lever to achieve such goals.
' Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 954 (citing French v. McAnamey, 195 N.E. 714 (Mass. 1935)).
178 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 48 tbl.5 1
(2001) (showing sixty-nine percent of males and over seventy-one percent of females between
thirty-five and forty-four are married).
179 R. Kelly Raley & Larry Bumpass, The Topography of the Divorce Plateau: Levels and
Trends in Union Stability in the United States after 1980, 8 DEMOGRAPHIC RES. 245,245 (2003),
http://www.demographic-research.org.
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